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This paper proposes to quantify the effect of social tariffs (ST) in the Portuguese water 
and waste sector (WWS). It calculates the amount of subsidy implicit in ST schemes, 
characterising the existing tariffs in 2011 and producing a synthetic tariff scene where 
the regulator’s recommendation is respected. This is the first time such an exercise is 
undertaken and it is very relevant in a context of deep economic crisis. Results suggest 
that there are fewer beneficiaries than what income eligibility criteria would imply and 
that putting the regulator’s recommendation in practice would considerably raise 
subsidy amounts, potentially leading to a severe increase in non-subsidised user tariffs 
to allow for break-even. 




The issue of economic affordability and access to water and waste services (WWS) has 
been widely explored in economic literature.
1
 Nevertheless, few studies have been 
conducted that aim at quantifying the impact of the subsidisation mechanisms in place. 
In Portugal, some preliminary studies have been performed, but a comprehensive 
review is still lacking.
2
 As the country undergoes a severe economic crisis that is 
forcing families into increasing budgetary constraints, this matter is highly relevant.  
In 2009 and 2010, the Portuguese Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority 
(ERSAR) issued two recommendations focusing on the design of WWS tariffs, 
Recommendation no. 1/2009 (R1/09) and Recommendation no. 2/2010.
3
 These 
documents intended to constitute a benchmark for defining tariffs and contribute to 
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 See Section 4. and References for a detailed list of sources. 
2
 In 2009, ERSAR gathered information regarding the existence of social tariffs in Portuguese 
municipalities. The data were used to assess the implications of applying ERSAR’s tariff guidelines on 
affordability. This analysis was not published, though.  
3
 See ERSAR (2009) and ERSAR (2010a), respectively. 
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harmonise pricing schemes,  attaining reasonable, clear and affordable prices. However, 
they are “soft law” mechanisms and do not have the required binding power to ensure 
compliance. As such, even with an incresing adherence to what is advocated in those 
recommendations, there continues to exist a considerable degree of heterogeneity 
among municipalities. This diversity raises several obstacles. It misleads end-users, 
does not reflect in many cases the true cost of providing the service, be it because it is 
too expensive or too cheap, and creates situations of unaffordable prices, as well as 
situations of lack of cost recovery by the operators. Moreover, despite ERSAR’s effort 
to disseminate easily interpretable and readily available information, clients are 
constrained in their ability to understand this inter-municipal variability. 
This project addresses social tariffs (ST) and assesses their impact on operators’ 
revenues. The reference year is 2011 and the municipality is the relevant unit of 
analysis. All the 278 municipalities of mainland Portugal are covered, of which 
approximately 50% administer ST. 
On the one hand, a comparison between the no-social-tariff scenario and the ST that are 
currently offered is presented. On the other, the ST that would be applied if all operators 
followed R1/09 are compared against the setting without ST. These exercises are then 
used to infer the amount of cross-subsidisation that ensures operators are neutral to the 
application of ST. Hence, the paper is an important tool for policy-makers, regulators, 
operators and clients, so that future amendments to legislation can be developed more 
consistently within the Portuguese reality. 
The paper also discusses eligibility criteria. According to R1/09, eligibility is uniquely 
conditional on income, but actual criteria implemented by the operators may include 
age, professional status and disability conditions, among other.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the Portuguese 
WWS sector, introducing the regulation authority and its role; Section 3 defines ST, 
presents and discusses R1/09, and bounds the scope of the study; Section 4 makes a 
short literature review and summarises the key implications; Section 5 is devoted to data 
collection, shortcomings and strategies used to surmount them; Section 6 lays down the 
methodology followed to perform the abovementioned comparisons; Section 7 presents 
the empirical results for water provision and highlights the main findings; and finally, 
Section 8 concludes, drawing upon the most relevant policy implications. Additionally, 
this project features a separate Appendix volume, where data, auxiliary computations, 
methodological aspects and results are discussed in greater depth. 
 
2. WATER AND WASTE SERVICES IN PORTUGAL 
2.1.  The Sector 
The Portuguese WWS sector is very heterogeneous, with its 357 economically regulated 
providers following different management models, operating on diverse geographic 
scales and employing differing quantity and quality levels of both human and physical 
resources.
4
 This diversity has contributed to hamper the enforcement of a single modus 
operandum, delaying the achievement of the sector’s policy goals and ultimately 
conceding WWS providers a considerable degree of discretion, namely in tariff setting. 
Table 1 summarizes the different tariff structures applied in Portuguese municipalities. 
Even when tariff structures coincide, it is virtually impossible to find two identical price 
lists, leading ERSAR to conclude that the tariff dispersion in Portugal is worrying (see 
Table 2). Moreover, in some municipalities WWS are not charged, which compromises 
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 Figure for economically regulated providers obtained through ERSAR’s intranet: https://portal.ersar.pt/. 
See also ERSAR (2010b). 
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the sustainability of their provision.
5
  
Table 1 Water tariff structures (% municipalities) 
 
Charging Structure  
Fixed charge only 0.6% 
Variable charge only 10.7% 




Increasing Block Tariff 84.1% 
Full Progressive Tariff 14.9% 





Source: Martins et al. (2012) 
i An increasing block tariff is a multi-part tariff where the volumetric component changes in steps as consumption 
increases. By contrast, in a full progressive tariff the price of the last block is applied to the total consumption 
volume. 
 
Table 2 WWS monthly charges for an average Portuguese household consuming 10m
3
 of water/month 
 
 WWS Water Provision Wastewater Treatment Undifferentiated Waste Management 
Average 19.11€ 9.80€ 5.69€ 3.62€ 
Max 40.52€ 20.38€ 20.10€ 12.75€ 
Min 2.53€ 1.50€ 0.00€ 0.00€ 
Diff (Max-Min) 37.99€ 18.88€ 20.10€ 12.75€ 
Source: ERSAR (2012) 
 
In 1993, the sector was divided into two components: bulk and retail service, 
corresponding to the separation between gross (i.e., multi-municipal) and retail 
provision activities, the former  being transfered to the central Government.
6
 
WWS present important distinguishing features, highlighted in the next subsections. 
 
2.1.1. Water 
The water sector comprises two complementary activities: water provision and 
wastewater collection and treatment. It is a typical network industry, where the natural 
monopoly is the dominant market structure. Nevertheless, water is different from the 
remaining utilities such as electricity, gas or telecommunications, given (i) the regional 
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 In 2011, 17 operators did not charge wastewater treatment, waste collection was not billed by another 15 
and 6 municipalities failed to cash in any of these services. See ERSAR (2012). 
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scale of the monopoly, resulting in a large number of providers (ii) high transportation 
costs, (iii) service fragmentation and (iv) lack of an integrated provision system. 
Water is a necessity with very low substitutability with other goods, leading to fairly 
low income and price demand elasticities.
7
 Tellingly, water services are recognised as a 
human right and play a crucial role in all sectors of economic activity.
8
 
As regards retail services, municipalities are responsible for choosing the management 
model that best suits local needs, according to the subsidiarity principle.
9
 Broadly 
speaking, there are three management models: direct management, indirect management 
through municipalised services and delegation to private entities in the form of 
concessions. Despite the growth of private players in the sector, direct management 
continues to be the most widespread form of organisation.
10
  
Whatever the type of management chosen, water services must fulfil public service 
obligations. These include universal access (UA), affordability, equity, quality of 
service and transparency, which can sometimes be conflicting, but are necessary to 
ensure the protection of clients’ rights.
11
 UA is especially important for the present 
analysis, as it implies that certain groups of users must be put on exception conditions. 
ST are one of the mechanisms used to achieve this purpose, as they imply redistribution 
towards low-income individuals. 
 
2.1.2. Waste 
The waste sector does not constitute a network industry. Thus, there is no typical 
                                                        
7
 For estimates based on Portuguese data, see Martins & Fortunato (2005) and Monteiro (2010). 
8
 On the 28
th
 July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 64/292 recognizing 
the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right.  
9
 The subsidiarity principle states that decisions should be taken at the lowest practical level. Specifically, 
it implies that central government should rely on local authorities to perform local tasks and intervene 
only when these are not capable of effectively handling local issues. Definition following Article 5 of the 
Treaty of the European Union. See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm. 
10
 See Tables 1A and 1B in Appendix 1. 
11
 See Marques (2010). 
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monopoly case, although the economies of scale due to high initial investment costs and 
the operation of treatment plants favour a non-competitive market environment for 
efficiency reasons. At the retail level, the sector comprises waste collection and 
transportation and is mainly directly secured by municipalities.
12
  
Waste services demand is relatively more price-sensitive than water, but still displays 
considerable rigidity, which decreases with the availability of recycling opportunities.
13
  
The sector has been growing in importance, as waste production is inherent to all 
economic activity and is intrinsically connected to the population’s quality of life.
14
  
Tariffs, similarly to what happens for water, present a wide regional variation in end-
user charges. The fact that waste collection is charged according to water consumption, 





2.2.  ERSAR 
ERSAR is the Portuguese regulatory agency for drinking water supply, wastewater 
management and municipal waste management. It is also the national authority for 
drinking water quality control.
16
  
Its activity is limited to a light form of benchmarking regulation, known in the literature 
as Sunshine Regulation (SR).
17
 SR consists of the comparison and public disclosure of 
performance indicators for the regulated service providers. This form of regulation is 
not coercive and rests on pressuring the operators by a virtual form of competition: 
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 See Table 1C in Appendix 1.  
13
 See Morris & Holthausen Jr. (1994) and Podolsky & Spiegel (1998). 
14
 See Johnstone & Labonne (2004) for an examination of the determinants of household solid waste 
generation rates using OECD-country data. 
15
 On the (in)efficiency of providing water and waste services together, see Simões et al. (2012). 
16
 Decree-Law no. 277/2009 of October 2
nd
. The existence of a sector specific regulation for waste is an 
atypical situation by international standards. See, for instance, Simões et al. (2010). 
17
 See Marques; Simões & Pires (2010).  
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ERSAR is not empowered to impose fines. Despite these limitations, the Portuguese 
regulatory experience is quite positive, even if the causality between regulation and 
service enhancing is certainly debatable.
18
   
Due to its “soft law” attributions, ERSAR is constrained in tariff setting and cannot 
intervene directly in prices, though it may be called to issue an opinion. R1/09, aimed at 
a more harmonised, rational and transparent tariff scene is simply a set of guidelines, 
but assessing its appropriateness remains a valid contribution to gauge the adherence to 
what it advocates and identify opportunities for rectification.  
 
3. OBJECT OF STUDY 
3.1.  The Concept of Social Tariffs 
In the context of this project, a social tariff is broadly defined as a reduced price 
targeted at vulnerable domestic clients. ERSAR separates these from family tariffs, 
which are also a means of providing social support.
19
 
ST eligibility may depend on multiple criteria, such as age or employment status, or 
simply on an income criterion as implied by R1/09: “drinking water supply, urban 
wastewater and municipal waste management tariffs should be reduced for household 
users whose household gross income does not exceed a certain value determined by the 
operator, and shall not exceed twice the annual value of the minimum monthly wage.”
20
 
Note that R1/09 does not establish a specific income threshold, nor does it let it depend 
on the size or composition of the household. Implications are discussed below. A 
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 Between 1993 and 2009, drinking water quality control in Portugal has exploded from 50% to 98%. 
See ERSAR (2010c). See also Marques & Simões (2008) on the appropriateness of SR to Portugal. 
19
 For benchmarking purposes, neither the UK nor France have distinct support mechanisms for the poor 
and larger families. See the British Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT) website: http://www. 
ofwat.gov.uk/consumerissues/problemspayingbill/watersure/ and the official site of the French 
Administration: http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/ F1557.xhtml, respectively. 
20
 ERSAR (2009). 
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possible amendment would involve resorting to equivalence scales.
21
 
This analysis assumes that all municipalities adopt the threshold of twice the annual 
value of the minimum monthly wage (MMW), i.e., an annual gross income for tax 
purposes of 13580€.
22
 Though arguably unrealistic, this assumption is used for 
simplicity and allows for producing as encompassing an analysis as possible. 
The social discounts currently applied are largely arbitrary and display the same 
heterogeneity found in general user tariffs. On the contrary, R1/09 suggests that “the 
recommended reduction (…), in the case of water services, must be achieved through 
the exemption of fixed tariffs and the application of the first block of the variable tariffs 
to the user’s total consumption, up to a monthly limit of 15m³ and, in the case of 
municipal waste management services, through exemption of their fixed tariff.”
23
  
Importantly, the recommendation advocates a consistent criterion across regions, but not 
a uniform tariff structure, since the large price disparities may result from differing 
levels of water stress, population density, and even budget and political priorities. 
Even so, the text of R1/09 leaves room for improvement. The exemption of the fixed 
tariff is blind with regards to household composition. Since water consumption is 
essentially conditional on the number of users rather than on income profiles, this 
exemption proportionately benefits smaller households.
24
  
Moreover, extending the reduced price up to 15m
3
/month is likely to subsidise wasteful 
consumption. Actually, for a subsample of 77 Portuguese municipalities, the average 
                                                        
21
 Equivalence scales would be a nice instrument in bridging the concepts of social and family tariffs.  
Some examples include the “Oxford Scale”, which assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, 0.7 
to each additional adult and 0.5 to each child, the “OECD-modified Scale”, where the household head is 
assigned a value of 1, each additional adult is worth 0.5 and each additional child 0.3, and the “Square 
Root Scale”, which divides household income by the square root of household size. See OECD’s website 
on social and welfare issues: http://www.oecd.org/social/familiesandchildren/. 
22
 The MMW for 2011 was 485€, which was transformed into an annual figure by multiplying by 14 
months and then doubling the resulting value: 485×14×2=13580€. This amount includes transfers. 
23
 ERSAR (2009). 
24
 Smets (2012). 
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Finally, the income eligibility threshold could be adjusted for municipal purchasing 
power, demographic and employment profiles. In the U.K., for example, where the 
regulatory system for water services is one of the most advanced in the world, there are 
two complementary social support mechanisms – WaterSure (the vulnerable groups’ 
tariff, which is mandatory) and company social tariffs. They are designed to take in 
clients with a diversified set of characteristics that may constrain their ability to afford 
water bills, such as clients entitled to a jobseeker’s allowance, housing tax credit or 
suffering from medical conditions requiring significant additional use of water 
(psoriasis, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis), and call for the active participation of 





3.2.  Scope of Analysis 
This subsection limits the scope of the study and discusses the implications. 
Firstly, the analysis focuses on 2011 tariffs. Even if WWS are subject to 6% VAT, 
VAT-free tariffs are used, because neither municipal price lists nor ERSAR’s tariff 
library include VAT. 
Secondly, the paper addresses domestic end-users. As such, cross-subsidisation occurs 
only between domestic consumers, abstracting from the potential cross subsidy between 
industrial, institutional and domestic users. 
                                                        
25
 The water consumption summary statistics for this sample are an average of 6.69m
3
/month, the mode is 
4.73m
3
/month and the median is 5.62m
3
/month. See Table 2A in Appendix 2. Conversely, an average 
monthly water consumption of 10m
3
 is usually attributed by ERSAR to the representative Portuguese 
household. See ERSAR (2012). 
26
 See DEFRA – the British Government Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2012) 
and OFWAT’s website: http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/consumerissues/problemspaying bill/watersure/. 
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Thirdly, it is assumed that providers are indifferent to applying ST as this does not 
affect profits, because of cross-subsidisation. Specifically, provision cost is not 
considered and revenues change only in composition, not value.
27
  
Fourthly, the activities studied are water provision (WP), wastewater treatment (WT) 
and undifferentiated waste management (UWM). Due to space constraints, the main text 
presents an in-depth analysis for WP, the service that gathers the greatest relative 
importance, with the corresponding output for WT and UWM being deferred to the 
Appendix volume. Results focus on monthly consumption profiles of 5 and 10m
3
 with a 
special emphasis on the former, as 5m
3
 is closest to actual average subsidised use of 
7m
3
. These profiles are meant to be compatible with ERSAR’s database, which uses the 
three monthly consumption profiles of 5, 10 and 15m
3
. Importantly, it is assumed that 
price changes implied by the introduction of ST do not affect WWS demand.
28
  
Finally, only operators that have submitted tariff information to ERSAR and operate on 
retail service are considered, i.e., 338 out of the 357 economically regulated operators. 
This translates into the total 278 municipalities for WP and WT and only 258 for UWM. 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature distinguishes between water and waste services, since, as described 
previously, the two sectors present important differences. 
There is mixed evidence on the impact of management and regulation of WWS utilities 
on the efficiency of provision. For the water sector, Aubert & Reynaud (2005) study 
211 Wisconsin water utilities under various regulatory regimes using a stochastic cost 
frontier approach and show that efficiency can be partly explained by the regulatory 
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 Explicitly, ST are fully paid by the remaining domestic clients. 
28
 This is in line with the discussion of WWS demand elasticities. 
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framework. Marques (2006) shows that the regulatory strategy adopted in Portugal can 
effectively provide incentives for service enhancement. This result is corroborated in 
Marques & Simões (2008), who follow the evolution of waste utilities’ performance 
indicators, and show a progressive improvement in the market.
29
 However, Marques & 
Simões (2009a and 2009b), using the non-parametric technique of data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), show that there is significant inefficiency in the Portuguese waste 
sector (bulk segment). Simões et al. (2010) and Simões & Marques (2011) further 
conclude that the operational environment is a key determinant of utilities’ efficiency.
30
  
On efficient water pricing, Renzetti (1992, 1999) uses data from Vancouver, and 
Ontario, Canada, to show that inefficient under-pricing induces wasteful over-
consumption and results in welfare losses which are estimated at approximately 4% for 
Vancouver. Garcia & Reynaud (2004) evaluate the pricing of water utilities in the 
Bordeaux area and show that marginal-cost pricing is efficient (as in Chambouleyron 
(2004)), but find significant differences between optimal and observed pricing schemes, 
while concluding for a negligible impact of moving towards efficient prices.  
Cremer et al. (2001) and Cremer & Gahvari (2002) study redistribution through non-
linear prices. While, ideally, redistribution should be made through income taxes, they 
provide a theoretical framework where ST may be appropriate. The argument builds on 
preference separability and implies that people with a lower (higher) than average 
valuation of the public sector must face an above-(below)-marginal-cost price for the 
public good. 
In what concerns affordability and the equity aspects of provision, Reynaud (2006) 
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 The hypothesis that improved performance is not due to the regulatory framework cannot be discarded, 
though. 
30
 The methodological approaches include a non-parametric DEA bootstrap model and the parametric 
benchmarking technique of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), respectively. 
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finds that opening the water sector to private capital does not improve the situation of 
the worse-off households. García-Valiñas et al. (2010) use data on southern Spain and 
discuss the appropriateness of the traditional affordability indicators, suggesting a 
revision of these measures based on basic water amounts. Sawkins & Dickie (2005) 
provide a critique of the various financial support mechanisms currently available to 
households in Great Britain, relating their findings to the social inclusion agenda of the 
government. They stress the importance of affordability benchmarks and clear policies 
towards the mitigation of affordability problems. 
The reference which is closest to the present analysis is a recent paper by Martins et al. 
(2012) which computes Essential Minimum Quantities (EMQCs) and shows that water 
charges are not a disproportionate burden for the average household. However, when 
considering the 20% poorest households, there are affordability problems in an 
important number of municipalities, providing evidence for socio-economic inequity 
that favours the better-off households. The exercise proposed in this work project, while 
disregarding EMQCs and the properties of specific tariff structures in place, improves 
upon Martins et al. in a number of directions: (i) it takes into account municipal social 
tariffs, (ii) assesses the appropriateness of the regulator’s recommendation that deals 
with social concerns in water provision, and (iii) provides a rough measure of the take-




5. DATA: SOURCES, PROBLEMS AND OVERCOMING STRATEGIES 
This project uses data from four sources: ERSAR, the National Statistics Institute (INE), 
the Portuguese Tax Authority (TA), and data collected and produced by the author. 
                                                        
31
 The definition for take-up rate adopted throughout the paper follows that of OECD. Specifically, the 
take-up rate is measured as the ratio between the number of individuals or households who are receiving a 
certain benefit and the total number of those who are eligible for it. See OECD (2004). 
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Each is described in turn. 
ERSAR‘s 2011 tariff library (in Microsoft Excel® form) stores general domestic end-
user tariffs for three monthly consumption profiles (5, 10 and 15m
3
) calculated by 
providers for each municipality and service (WP, WT and UWM). Fixed and volumetric 
components and total service fees are presented separately. The database does not 
include ST, but it does indicate whether the municipality offers social and/or family 
tariffs. This information was the basis of the no-social-tariff baseline, described in the 
next section. 
The main problem with these data is that the charges are presented as final computations 
instead of formulas, not allowing for calculating ST through editing. For instance, the 
10m
3
 WP variable charge for Sever do Vouga reads a value of 6.1155€ instead of 
                       , the formula combining the prices for the first two 
consumption blocks. Importantly, the 0.4878€ and 0.7353€ values did not show up 
anywhere on the database, which forced the author to consult a large number of 
municipal regulations and edicts. As a side-product, it was possible to identify (i) 
several discrepancies between the database and the published price lists that were 
subsequently partially corrected by ERSAR, and (ii) tariffs with similar structures not 
always interpreted similarly, introducing some inconsistency in the data. An expressive 
example is that of waste tariffs, which commonly have a semi-fixed structure according 
to water consumption blocks, as illustrated in Graphic 1. While in some cases 0.25€ is 
introduced as the fixed charge for 5m
3
, in others it is interpreted as a variable charge. 
This poses a problem in computing R1/09 ST, because the recommendation advocates 
the exemption of the fixed component of the tariff. 
ERSAR’s 2011 Quality of Service Report was used to obtain the number of lodgings 
15 
 
with effective service, taken as the proxy for the total number of clients.
 32
 However, the 
available data feature non-integer lodging numbers, which were rounded where 
reasonable and discarded otherwise (e.g. 5.16 in Góis). Percentages above 100% were 
also ignored, adding up to missing information cases. These situations (roughly 15% of 
the observations) were handled by defining an Effective Connection Rate (ECR) 
indicator, taking its average by region (NUTSII) and multiplying by the total number of 
lodgings in the municipality, as summarised in Figure 1.
33
   
Graphic 1 Illustrative municipal waste tariff 
 
 
Figure 1 Imputing strategy to complete the data 
 
 
The total number of lodgings per municipality was taken from INE’s 2011 Census 
data.
34
 Micro data from the 2011 Household Budgetary Survey (HBS) were also used.
35
  
                                                        
32
 These lodgings might possibly include non-domestic users (e.g. small family businesses). However, 
such cases would be residual and ERSAR considers this to be the best available estimate. 
33
 Alternative strategies included taking the average by region and typology of the area of intervention 
(mainly urban, somewhat urban and mainly rural, according to ERSAR’s classification) and activity. The 
adopted strategy proved nevertheless more robust than these. 
34
 Available at INE’s online statistical database: http://www.ine.pt/. 
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The estimation of the number of potential beneficiaries according to R1/09 was 
achieved by combining the HBS with data from the Portuguese TA. The TA provided, 
for 2010, the gross total declared taxable income and the number of tax forms per 
municipality, in 5000€ brackets.
36
 The HBS, in turn, has household-level data, allowing 
for a full characterisation of the income distribution. However, the survey is 
representative only at the NUTSII level, forcing the assumption of a homogeneous 
distribution in the municipalities within a given NUTSII. Therefore, potential 
beneficiaries were computed as:
37
 
                                 ,                                   
 
Where         stands for potential users in municipality  ,           stand for the 
percentages of households with total gross income for tax purposes in the first three TA 
income brackets of [0, 5[, [5, 10[ and [10, 15[ thousand €,       is the HBS fraction of 
households within the [10000, 15000€[ bracket whose gross income does not exceed 
13580€/year, and     is the municipal number of households with effective service, i.e., 
the total number of clients per municipality. The subscript   stands for the NUTSII 
region to which municipality   belongs.38 
Finally, data on ST were mostly collected by the author. ERSAR’s database contains a 
binary variable for each municipal WWS service stating whether a ST exists. For those 
with ST, it was necessary to check the original provider price lists and documents 
stating eligibility criteria. Some of these were available at ERSAR, others (50%) were 
obtained via a municipal survey that also collected information on the actual number of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
35
 Data obtained via the INE/FCT/GPEARI Protocol. 
36
 Data requested by ERSAR for the development of the present work project. 
37
 Note that the eligibility limit of 13580€ adopted in the paper lies in the [10000,15000€[ TA bracket. 
38
 For further computational details, refer to Appendix 3.  
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social users and social consumption profiles.
39
 Some municipalities failed to 
discriminate between social and family tariffs or to clarify the social tariff structure in 
place, and were therefore discarded from the sample. As such, the municipalities 
included are not the same for each activity. Table 3 provides some summary measures.
40
 
R1/09 social tariffs also had to be computed. This involved taking the general user 
charges provided by ERSAR and adapting them to R1/09’s text as quoted in section 3.1. 
This was done for all municipalities studied, irrespective of the actual application of ST. 
Table 3 Municipalities offering social tariffs 
 
 WP WT UWM 
Municipalities offering Social Tariffs (ST)    
Number 134 107 99 
As a percentage of total
i
  48.2% 38.49% 35.61% / 38.37% 
Municipalities w/ST included in the study    
Number 101 77 68 
As a percentage of Municipalities offering ST 75.37% 71.96% 68.69% 
i For UWM, the first figure refers to the total number of municipalities in mainland Portugal (278), while the second 




In order to perform the comparisons between no-social-tariffs and applied ST, and 
between no-social-tariffs and R1/09 ST, three distinct tariff scenarios were set and two 
groups of users defined, according to Tables 4 and 5.
41
 
The methodological approach was then to consider two clusters of municipalities. On 
the one hand, the focus was only on those municipalities currently applying ST. For 
these, using the number of actual users, the comparison is made between S0 and S1 and 
between S0 and S2. This allows for assessing R1/09’s impact in terms of prices. Next, 
taking the potential number of beneficiaries, S0 is again set against S2. This enables a 
                                                        
39
 A copy of this questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4. 
40
 A detailed list can be found in Table 5A in Appendix 5. 
41
 Two notes on the calculation of actual tariffs: when the same tariff applies to two services, each service 
was imputed ½ of the charge; excepting those cases where it is clearly stated that discounts apply only 
below a given consumption volume , 1
st
 block discounts transited to the next blocks, e.g., a 50% 1
st
 block 
discount translated into                               
              
 
               . 
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complete evaluation of the prospective effect of applying R1/09 in those municipalities. 
On the other hand, all municipalities are analysed and S0 is compared with S2 using 
potential users. Figure 2 presents this methodology in tree form. The next section 
dissects the results. 
Table 4 Tariff Scenarios 
 
Tariff Scenarios Description Calculation Method 
S0 or Baseline No social tariffs Obtained directly through ERSAR’s tariff library 
S1 Actual ST Own calculations through municipal surveys 
S2 R1/09 ST Own calculations following R1/09’s text 
 
Table 5 Groups of Users 
 
Groups of Users Definition Calculation Method 
Actual Users Number of social clients as of 12/31/2011 Own calculations through municipal survey answers 
Potential Users Number of eligible users according to R1/09 Own calculations through HBS and TA data 
 




7. RESULTS FOR WATER PROVISION42 
 
7.1.  Municipalities Currently Applying ST 
In the municipalities currently applying ST, eligibility criteria are quite diverse. 
However, most municipalities do follow income criteria, as shown in Figure 3. 
In the vein of R1/09, about 36% of the ST analysed require solely an income criterion, 
but approximately 48% of these do adjust the criterion to household composition. 
Likewise, where the criteria include income and other characteristics (ca. 56% of the 
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 See Appendix 6. for further details and corresponding results for WT and UWM. 
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cases), 62% are household adjusted. This provides yet another reason for amending 
R1/09 as proposed in section 3.1.  
The criteria classified as “Other” include inter alia age, employment status, permanent 
residential location and retirement. Yet, it is rather rare to find a municipality where the 
only ST scheme applied falls into this category (4 out of 103 cases). More frequently, 
“Other” ST schemes are offered in tandem with income-based ST. 
Figure 3 Eligibility criteria in municipalities currently applying ST 
 
The quantification exercise (Table 6) shows that moving towards R1/09 prices while 
keeping the eligibility criteria constant increases total subsidisation by 7.91% and 
54.87% for the 5 and 10m
3
 consumption profiles, respectively.
43
 However, taking the 
number of potential users into account introduces forty-eight-fold and fifty-eight-fold 
increases in the figure for the two consumption profiles relative to the baseline.
44
  
Indeed, the thorough application of the upper bound definition of R1/09 covers a much 
wider universe of clients than what is implied by municipal criteria. This stems from a 
combination of inadequate take-up, possibly due to lack of ST awareness, and an 
adopted income threshold which may be too generous, since it implies that potential 
users are more than half the total number of domestic clients, forcing the remaining to 
                                                        
43
 Output measures’ definitions and formulas are presented in Appendix 6.1. 
44
 The differences between 5 and 10m
3
 are mainly due to the fact that, for 5m
3
, ST essentially involve the 
exemption from fixed tariffs, as in most municipalities the 1
st
 consumption block extends until 5 or 6m
3
, 
implying identical volumetric charges in S0 and S2. By contrast, for 10m
3
 there is a combined effect of 









an over 60% bill accrual, on average, in order to finance the consumption of those 
deemed most vulnerable. These two problems are very severe. Table 7 estimates, for a 
restricted sample of municipalities that apply municipal-specific definitions of R1/09, 
the dimension of insufficient take-up. Importantly, none of these municipalities has 
chosen the upper bound definition adopted in this paper, setting instead lower eligibility 
limits. Operators need to be mindful of this, as social support schemes cannot 
sustainably be designed for the majority of clients. 
Table 6 Average values for water provision output measures
i 
                  Municipalities currently applying ST (101) All municipalities (278) 
 Actual Users Potential Users Potential Users 
Number of users 
254.90 10254.11 9014.03 
1.31 1.23 1.43 
Percentage of users (%) 
2.83 57.98 59.87 
1.41 0.12 0.11 
 

















Total subsidy volume (€) 
687.74 760.72 742.11 1178.16 33285.66 52197.23 27104.73 42496.35 
1.85 2.05 1.75 1.63 1.51 1.53 1.87 1.85 
Subsidy per beneficiary (€) 
2.18 2.80 2.72 4.36 2.68 4.31 2.40 3.80 
0.58 0.67 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.50 0.68 0.57 
Bill accrual per non 
beneficiary (€) 
0.06 0.07 0.06 0.11 3.74 6.02 3.64 5.77 
1.66 1.94 1.45 1.38 0.65 0.53 0.76 0.64 
Percent bill accrual per non 
beneficiary (%) 
1.60 0.94 1.35 1.37 69.10 65.80 68.85 65.46 
1.67 1.88 1.62 1.56 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.47 
i Coefficients of variation are presented in italic. 
 
Table 7 Take-up rate in selected municipalities, with (P) calculated from (1) (in section 5.) adapted to 
municipal-specific eligibility thresholds 
 
Municipality Actual Users (A) Potential Users (P) Take-up Rate (A)/(P) 
Alijó 0 4892 0.00% 
Cartaxo 239 2151 11.11% 
Coimbra 19 17739 0.11% 
Esposende 139 4392 3.16% 
Fundão 558 4584 12.17% 
Leiria 81 10052 0.81% 
Portalegre 54 2177 2.48% 
Santarém 27 5890 0.46% 
Tomar 34 6423 0.53% 
Torres Vedras 573 14173 4.04% 
Vila Nova de Famalicão 47 8299 0.57% 
Vouzela 2 1245 0.16% 
 
 
Another result is that, as expected, adapting municipal tariffs to R1/09 leaves tariff 
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dispersion unchanged. Table 8 shows scatter plots for the amount of per capita subsidy 
(5m
3
/month) in the three scenarios concerning this first cluster of municipalities.  
Despite this inter-municipal variability, on average, each beneficiary is granted a per 
capita subsidy that does not change radically across the scenarios (Table 6). This 
situation contrasts with that of general domestic users, for whom, as previously 
discussed, the introduction of R1/09 carries important consequences. 
Table 8 Subsidy per beneficiary (€) for 5m
3
 in the municipalities currently applying ST 
 
Actual Users. 












7.2.  All Municipalities  
 
Extending the analysis to the whole set of mainland Portugal municipalities, the figures 
become even more evident (Table 6 above).  
Logically, the number of users is the main determinant of total subsidy volumes per 
municipality.
45
 Underlying tariff properties also have a say. High fixed tariffs determine 
                                                        
45






























































a greater subsidy, since the inexistence of the fixed component results in closer 
subsidised and non-subsidised bills. Naturally, high total baseline tariffs also lead to 
greater subsidisation. Like in the previous framework, general users would experience a 
heavy bill accrual if R1/09 were applied under the circumstances treated in the paper. 
Figure 4 shows a map of mainland Portugal with the percent bill accrual per 
municipality for 5m
3
/month. The Norte region concentrates the highest increments for 
non ST users (amounting to two-fold increases in WP bills), while the Alentejo stands 
out as the lightest region, where the percentage of operators that do not charge the fixed 
component of WP is highest (35.59%). Once again, this reflects general user tariff 
differences, so that the problem of tariff, and therefore, accrual dispersion, remains. 
Figure 4 Percent bill accrual for non beneficiaries (all municipalities, potential users, S0 vs. S2, 5m
3
) 
                             
 
In a real world setting, it is nevertheless expected that (i) the number of ST beneficiaries 
would be necessarily smaller, either because of reduced take-up or due to municipal 
eligibility thresholds below the 13580€ assumed in the paper, resulting in a lower 
accrual for remaining users, and (ii) the burden would likely be alleviated through 
0 – 25% 
25 – 50%  




sharing with non-domestic clients.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
This project paves the way to a deeper assessment of the functioning of social support 
mechanisms in the Portuguese WWS sector. As a first attempt at quantifying the 
amounts of cross-subsidization from “general” to “low-income” households implied by 
the thoroughly application of R1/09, it leaves important practical questions unaddressed. 
The most important is the homogeneous eligibility criterion used, when R1/09 allows 
each operator to set a different limit. This could be refined, e.g., using municipal 
purchasing power indexes and revising the estimation of potential users accordingly. 
Also, it would be interesting to evaluate the combined effect of R1/09 and 
Recommendation no. 2/2010, the latter explicitly tackling the tariff calculation criteria 
aiming at decreasing the current tariff heterogeneity. Furthermore, a caveat that will 
hopefully be coped with in the future has to do with the cost-side of WWS provision. 
An approach taking into account costs would be better prepared to discuss the 
appropriateness of applied prices. Nevertheless, this project remains an important 
doorway for studying WWS social support policies in Portugal.  
The main takeaways are: (i) a word of caution in setting income eligibility thresholds, 
since it is unreasonable to provide assistance to the majority of clients, as it implies a 
disproportionate burden on remaining users; (ii) the suggestions for amending R1/09, 
namely by adjusting for household size; (iii) the need to enhance communication with 
clients, specifically targeting the take-up gap in social support mechanisms; (iv) a 
generalised concern with WWS tariff dispersion, which remains one of the most 
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